


Toward a Whole Human Science

A Universifying Relational Meta-Disciplinary Approach

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June 25, 2026

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
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> *An empirical approach includes its own assumptions about reality. In one sense, a Western worldview is one narrative among many. Yet in another sense, science has brought something genuinely novel to the cross-traditional dialogue: a method that attempts to go beyond validation through lived personal and communal experience.*
>
> Hartelius, Thouin-Savard, and Richards Crouch, 2018, p. iv

Modern science emerged within a predominantly Western intellectual history and remains shaped by assumptions inherited from that tradition. Western forms of ontology (being), epistemology (knowing), and methodology (doing) have generated extraordinary explanatory power, particularly where phenomena can be isolated, measured, and experimentally manipulated (Morgan, 2005; Woodward, 2003). Yet every mode of inquiry foregrounds certain dimensions of reality while backgrounding others, and the assumptions that enable precise analysis of discrete variables can obscure relationality when extended to human phenomena whose development unfolds through mental, relational, cultural, and civilizational contexts (Bhaskar, 2008; Habermas, 1971; Taylor, 1985).

My interest in this inquiry emerged from a career spent leading multi-disciplinary teams whose members held divergent epistemological, ontological, and methodological orientations. As a researcher, entrepreneur, consultant, coach, and integrative practitioner, I have worked across the developmental spectrum with individuals, families, organizations, and communities, alongside psychologists, therapists, psychiatrists, physicians, scientists, educators, business leaders, traditional Chinese medicine doctors, Ayurvedic doctors, and policymakers, each operating from distinct assumptions about reality, knowledge, evidence, and effective action. Having originally judged these orientations from the Western scientific lens through which I was educated, these experiences repeatedly exposed the limits of disciplinary boundaries when applied to complex human realities, given that human development unfolds simultaneously through biological, psychological, relational, cultural, civilizational and consciousness dimensions that rarely conform neatly to the categorization of academic disciplines. The question that gradually emerged for me transcended judging orientations as true or false, instead evolving an emerging awareness of when different modes of knowing, doing, relating, and being are most contextually appropriate.

This question becomes even more relevant around phenomena that challenge conventional Western scientific assumptions. Practices such as meditation, yoga, acupuncture, and contemplative practice possess substantial empirical literatures demonstrating measurable effects on health, cognition, and wellbeing, despite originating in traditions whose ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies differ from those of modern Western science (Davidson & Dahl, 2018; Grof, 2000; Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Other areas, including research on anomalous human cognition, exceptional human experience, and extraordinary human capacities remain contested in mainstream scientific circles yet continue to generate findings that challenge the foundations of dominant scientific frameworks (Cardeña, 2018; Kelly et al., 2007; Radin, 2006). Whether ultimately confirmed, revised, or rejected, such cases raise a meta-scientific question: what kinds of phenomena become visible or invisible under different configurations of knowing, doing, relating, and being? Addressing it requires an expansion of scientific orientation capable of engaging a plurality of contexts without reducing them to a single worldview (Midgley, 2000; Nicolescu, 2002).

This need extends well beyond academia as contemporary challenges unfold across multiple scales at once, from individuals and families to organizations, civilizations, and the planetary system as a whole, and what appears beneficial at one scale often generates unintended consequences at another (Ostrom, 2009; Poteete, 2012; Soranno et al., 2014; Steffen et al., 2015; Suckling et al., 2021). These dynamics are visible in discussions of the meta-crisis, a crisis of crises, the convergence of ecological, economic, political, technological, and psychological disruptions that far exceed the explanatory capacity of any single discipline (Hedlund, 2021; Morin, 2008). This phenomenon can also be seen developmentally as a meta-chrysalis: a natural period of metamorphosis in which existing structures break down while new forms of organization begin to emerge (Wright, 2025a). As civilizational influence becomes more distributed across cultures and knowledge traditions through the proliferation of technology, inherited assumptions about what counts as legitimate knowledge are themselves drawn into question (Hui, 2016).

This argument develops in appreciative dialogue with the whole person psychology tradition cultivated at the California Institute for Human Science (Hartelius, 2016), and with developmental science, complexity science, critical realism, and transdisciplinary studies. It extends conceptual work within the author's universifying meta-theory, including the universifying meta-pattern (Wright, 2022) and its meta-cultural civilizational application (Wright, 2024). Because aspects of this work remain emergent, the paper is best understood as an exploratory contribution intended to expand, strengthen and critically examine these developing foundations. The orientation toward contemporary science is appreciative rather than adversarial as the achievements of modern science are among humanity's greatest intellectual accomplishments; the claim here is that each discipline reveals part of a larger landscape that benefits from both a meta-disciplinary and relational orientation in support of a more whole human science.

The paper proceeds as follows beyond the introduction. Section II situates the human sciences within their historical and philosophical context and highlights sources of their fragmentation. Section III examines the substance inheritance underlying much of that fragmentation and the relational correction already underway within Western thought. Section IV introduces meta-disciplinarity and the universifying orientation. Section V reads complexity science and developmental science as partial relational turns that support a further step. Section VI proposes relatology, the study of relating, as a co-equal fourth domain of inquiry in addition to epistemology, methodology and ontology. Section VII derives the universifying framework of epmereontology, the meta-study of knowing, doing, relating and being. Section VIII grounds the framework meta-culturally in the relational wisdom of relatively independently developed civilizations. Section IX tests it against the case of whole person psychology. Section X outlines whole human science as the integrative horizon, and Section XI considers limitations and future directions.

II. Human Sciences in Context

The substance ontology of Western thought can be traced through a sequence of decisive formulations, each of which have contributed to contemporary science. Aristotle (1998) established substance (*ousia*) as the primary category of being, that which exists in itself and of which all else is predicated. Descartes (1996) partitioned reality into thinking substance and extended substance, installing a gap between mind and world that subsequent philosophy has labored to bridge. Kant (1998) preserved the structure while critiquing it, positing a thing-in-itself beyond the reach of the knowing subject. Newton's (1999) science operationalized the same commitment: a universe of discrete bodies whose relations

are external forces acting between separate things. Across these formulations the constant is that objects are primary and relations derivative, and while alternative relational and process-oriented currents persisted, from Heraclitus (2001) to Hegel (1977) to Whitehead (1929), the substance-oriented lineage became the dominant influence on modern scientific assumptions (Ladyman & Ross, 2007).

The human sciences emerged as a historically differentiated response to the problem of understanding human life, with Dilthey's (1989) distinction between the natural sciences and the human sciences among the earliest systematic attempts to formalize the divide, grounding the human sciences in interpretive understanding (*Verstehen*) rather than causal explanation (*Erklären*). Positivist movements nonetheless sought to align human inquiry with the methods of the natural sciences, treating humans as objects rather than subjects (Comte, 1853; Durkheim, 1982), while hermeneutic, phenomenological, and interpretive traditions insisted that meaning and lived experience are constitutive of human reality, leading to the development of Weber's (1978) interpretive sociology, Gadamer's (2004) hermeneutics, Foucault's (1970) post-structuralism, Habermas' (1971) critical theory, Luhmann's (1995) systems theory and Bhaskar's (2008) critical realism. The result is not yet a stable duality but an unresolved tension in the human sciences between the aspiration toward formalization, prediction and objectification on one side and the irreducibility of meaning, context, complexity and historical situatedness on the other (Morin, 2008).

This tension becomes fragmentation when translated into institutional form, as disciplinary boundaries increasingly reflect methodological commitments rather than ontological clarity, producing what Kuhn (2012) describes as incommensurable paradigms rather than cumulative integration. The standard explanation treats fragmentation as the inevitable price of complexity, that there is too much to know for any single discipline to encompass, so increasing specialization is necessary, and yet this obscures a deeper issue, that modern scientific epistemology, shaped by the successes of classical physics, privileges discrete entities, linear causality, and isolable variables as the primary units of explanation (Bhaskar, 2008). When these assumptions are extended to human phenomena, relational and developmental processes are often reconstituted within individualist methodological frameworks as aggregates of individual-level properties, thereby obscuring or flattening emergent dynamics that arise from higher-order relational organization (Emirbayer, 1997).

Critical realism offers one of the most robust critiques of this reduction, with Bhaskar (2008) arguing that empirical regularities do not exhaust reality and that generative mechanisms often operate at levels not directly observable, and so the human sciences are structurally limited when they equate reality with what is measurable under controlled conditions. Habermas (1971) distinguishes technical, practical, and emancipatory cognitive interests, warning that the dominance of technical rationality marginalizes forms of understanding oriented toward meaning and self-reflection. Taylor (1985) shows that human agency is embedded in interpretive frameworks that causal explanation alone cannot capture. Bourdieu (1988) and Luhmann (1995) add the institutional dimension, that scientific fields acquire internal logics of power and legitimacy, and modern science differentiates into functionally autonomous subsystems that communicate through internal codes, each becoming more sophisticated within its domain while less capable of integration across domains.

From this vantage point, a central problem of the human sciences is not insufficient data or methods or rigor but the absence of an explicit account of relationality as a domain of inquiry in its own right (Emirbayer, 1997). Systems theory, cybernetics, ecological psychology, and complexity science began challenging substance assumptions in the mid-twentieth century by emphasizing interaction, emergence, and

self-organization (Bateson, 1972; Bertalanffy, 1968; Morin, 2008). These were genuine moves toward relational thinking, yet in the formal academic disciplines relation was typically absorbed into existing structures rather than transforming them, treated as a secondary structure linking pre-existing entities rather than as a generative condition through which entities themselves emerge (Barad, 2007; Emirbayer, 1997). The following section examines why that backgrounding runs so deep, and why it is yet to turn the tide in the human sciences.

III. The Substance Inheritance and Its Correction

A civilization that takes being to consist of separable substances develops a corresponding epistemology of separation in which knower and known are positioned as distinct, subject and object are held apart, and self and world are treated as independently existing domains (Aristotle, 1998; Descartes, 1996). Within this orientation, substance ontology tends to align with epistemological and methodological commitments that privilege discrete entities, stable properties, and isolatable variables, producing a recursive coherence across ontology, epistemology, and methodology in which inquiry reinforces the very categories it presupposes (Dewey, 1938; Kuhn, 2012). Measurement practices, experimental designs, and representational frameworks become tuned to detect and stabilize objects as primary units of analysis, thereby reproducing the metaphysical assumptions embedded in their construction (Hacking, 1983; Latour, 2005). Over time, this alignment continues to sediment into a taken-for-granted explanatory grammar in which relations appear derivative, secondary, or merely external connections between already-constituted substances, rather than generative dimensions through which entities come to be intelligible (Whitehead, 1929; Barad, 2007). From within such a grammar, it becomes reasonable to interpret relationality as an additive feature of a fundamentally atomic world, even though there are comprehensive alternative processual and relational ontologies that treat relations as fundamentally constitutive rather than descriptively supplementary (Whitehead, 1929; Dewey, 1938; Latour, 2005).

The consequences of these orientations extend well beyond philosophy and science, as an ontology of separate individuals underwrites the social atomism of modern political and economic thought; an ontology of inert matter underwrites extractive economics and ecological alienation; and an ontology of discrete domains underwrites the disciplinary silos of the academy and thus education, in which the relations between fields are treated as administrative inconveniences rather than as objects of inquiry (Foucault, 1970; Luhmann, 1995). Indeed, the current meta-crisis we find ourselves entrenched in as a civilization is at least partially due to these fundamental philosophical orientations built into the fabric of our societal structures (Hedlund, 2021). Fragmentation then, is not so much an accident that befell the human sciences as it is the natural form they take as they emerge from within the bounds of a substance-first ontology (Bhaskar, 2008).

The Western philosophical tradition recursively sensed its own problem: Whitehead (1929) reconceived reality as process and relation, with actual occasions constituted by their prehensions of one another; Heidegger (1962) dissolved the worldless subject into being-in-the-world; Merleau-Ponty (2012) returned the knower to its body and the body to its world; and Barad (2007) argued that relata do not precede relations but emerge through intra-action. These internal dissenters within the Western philosophical tradition show that the critique of substance primacy is not only an external imposition on Western thought but an immanent development within it, and they demonstrate, by their persistent marginality relative to mainstream practice, how powerfully the loop resists correction from within.

It's important not to reject either polarity of Western analytical rigor or relational holism, but rather generate the institutional capacity to hold both in generative tension (Midgley, 2000; Morin, 2008). Western science remains, as Hartelius, Thouin-Savard, and Richards Crouch (2018) observe, a genuinely novel contribution to cross-traditional dialogue, a disciplined method for extending understanding beyond personal and communal validation. The task before the human sciences is to integrate that which is helpful, and to absent what is not (Bhaskar, 2008), thereby widening the ontological frame within which the human sciences operate, so that relations become as investigable as the subjects and objects they relate. A useful orientation for this widening comes from the stratified ontology of critical realism, in which reality is disclosed through the *empirical*, the observationally accessible; the *actual*, events and processes that occur regardless of observation; and the *real*, the generative structures through which patterns of occurrence become possible (Bhaskar, 2008). From Bhaskar's perspective, the sciences are not studying separate worlds but different dimensions of one interconnected reality, but an unresolved challenge here is how to fully integrate multi-perspectival epistemologies (Hedlund, 2021), as well as a wider frame outside the Western bounds of ontology and epistemology that creates space for the contextual primacy of relationality (Wright, 2025a). The next sections develop the conceptual architecture for expanding relationality of disciplines as one such critical dimension.

IV. Meta-disciplinarity

Two terms carry particular weight in what follows. *Universifying* names a meta-theoretical orientation concerned with recurring 'unifying' and 'diversifying' developmental patterns across domains, scales, and cultural contexts without collapsing their differences, aiming to hold the generative tension in coherence through contextual prioritization between the polarities of uniformity and universality on one end of the spectrum and diversity and plurality on the other (Wright, 2022, 2024, 2025a, 2025b). *Universification*, a derivative of universifying meta-theory, names the process of 'unification' and 'diversification' through which differentiated forms become more integrated while preserving their sovereign uniqueness, describing neither a final unified theory nor a relativistic plurality of disconnected perspectives, but a developmental holding container in which difference and coherence emerge together (Wright, 2024, 2025a, 2025b).

A universifying approach to meta-disciplinarity is the orientation through which this universification process is brought to bear on knowledge itself. Where inter-disciplinarity seeks collaboration between disciplines and trans-disciplinarity seeks inquiry that moves across or beyond them (Nicolescu, 2002), meta-disciplinarity operates at a level of abstraction where it studies disciplinarity itself, how disciplines emerge, differentiate, stabilize, relate, and transform within wider systems of knowledge, and as a discipline of disciplines, it does not seek to replace existing disciplines with a single integrative framework (unless that is most contextually appropriate, and can be done while preserving genuine diversity), but provides a meta-frame through which the range of expressions of disciplinarity, from mono-disciplinary, multi-disciplinary to inter-disciplinary to trans-disciplinary forms can be compared, critiqued, and situated according to their contextual appropriateness.

This orientation draws several traditions into a common frame: Kuhn (2012) shows that scientific development proceeds through transformations in foundational assumptions rather than simple accumulation; Foucault (1972) reveals how epistemes condition what can appear as truth within a period; Bourdieu (1988) shows how academic fields are structured through relations of power and legitimacy; Luhmann (1995) describes science as differentiated into functionally autonomous subsystems; and Morin (2008) argues that analytical power has been bought at the cost of a diminished capacity to apprehend

interdependence. These highlight how disciplines emerge as stabilized epistemic formations rather than neutral partitions of reality, with each expressing a configuration of ontology, epistemology, and methodology institutionalized through curricula, peer review, funding, and publication, so that what appears as disciplinary objectivity is inseparable from historically sedimented practice.

Meta-disciplinarity can therefore be both diagnostic and generative, clarifying the limits of current disciplinary forms and opening conceptual space for alternative configurations. Its danger lies at two poles: one is collapse into a pluralism that fails to determine which disciplines are appropriate in which context; the other is universalism, the claim that one way applies to all, which collapses difference into sameness. A universifying orientation holds these polarities in generative tension, supporting a relational and dialogical process that works toward a more reliably precise and pragmatic orientation for each context without binding itself in advance to any single epistemology, ontology, or methodology.

V. Partial Relational Turns: Complexity and Developmental Sciences

Two contemporary fields have moved further toward relation than most — complexity and developmental science — and examining where each stops clarifies the step that remains. Complexity science reframes explanation away from reductionist approaches to isolating entities toward approaches that acknowledge interacting irreducible complex systems, showing how macro-patterns emerge from micro-level processes through feedback, adaptation, and self-organization (Holland, 1998; Mitchell, 2009; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). It demonstrates empirically that relational interaction produces emergent structure and that stability arises through dynamic process rather than static essence (Capra & Luisi, 2014; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). While certain strands of complexity theory explicitly focus on developing a relational ontology (Stacey, 2007), the broader tradition in mathematics, physics, and systems science has also made foundational contributions to formalizing relationality through the study of interaction, feedback, nonlinearity, and emergence. Network theory, nonlinear dynamics, and complex adaptive systems models have been particularly significant in rendering relational structure analytically tractable, allowing patterns of interdependence, coupling, and systemic feedback to be described with a level of precision not previously available (Byrne, 1998; Holland, 1998). At the same time, these formalizations tend to operationalize complexity as a property of system behavior rather than as an ontological claim about the primacy of relations. Within this tension, entities continue to function as primary carriers of properties, with relations modeled as interactions among pre-given units rather than as the generative conditions through which those units themselves become distinguishable. Even in more explicitly relational approaches, this dual movement persists between relational description and residual entity primacy (Cilliers, 1998; Latour, 2005).

A second contemporary field supports complexity science in its turn toward relationality: cognitive science and phenomenology-informed enactivism. Rather than treating cognition as the computation of internal representations of an external world, enactive approaches frame cognition as emerging through embodied, situated, and ongoing interaction between organism and environment (Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007). Perception and meaning are thus not products of detached observation but arise through structural coupling, where living systems and environments co-determine one another across time (Maturana & Varela, 1987). This shifts explanation away from internal substance-like mental states toward relational processes of enactment, emphasizing that cognition is something organisms do rather than something they possess (Di Paolo et al., 2017). At the same time, much of this field still retains a

minimal ontological asymmetry between organism and environment, or between embodied subject and world, even when emphasizing their coupling. The explanatory emphasis often remains centered on the organism as the locus of cognition, with environment functioning as a condition or partner in interaction rather than as co-constitutive in a fully symmetric ontological sense (Thompson, 2007). Even in its strongest formulations, relationality is frequently articulated as dynamic coupling between pre-identified systems, rather than as a claim that system boundaries themselves are emergent, provisional, or analytically constructed. As a result, relations are treated as primary in explanatory terms, while entities persist as relatively stable units that enter into relation, rather than being constituted through relational differentiation itself (Varela et al., 1991; Di Paolo et al., 2017).

Developmental science adds what complexity science lacks: an account of how patterns undergo structured qualitative transformation over time. From Piaget's (1972) genetic epistemology through Vygotsky's (1978) socially mediated development to contemporary dynamic-systems and lifespan approaches, development has come to be understood as nonlinear and multi-determined, shaped by interactions across biological, psychological, and socio-cultural levels (Commons et al., 2008; Lerner, 2006). Bronfenbrenner's (1979) ecological systems theory situates individual development within nested environmental systems, and adult-developmental research shows that cognition and identity continue to transform across the lifespan in relationally shaped ways (Kegan, 1982; McCauley et al., 2006). Yet much of the field remains implicitly centered on the individual. Relational, cultural, and ecological contexts are often treated as external influences on individual trajectories, or as contexts within which individuals develop, rather than as relationally developing systems in their own right, so development is studied within systems more readily than as a property of systems.

At the same time, there is a body of emerging research grounding collective development through multiple converging research domains in which longitudinal, multi-level change can be directly observed in relational systems over time. In organizational science, long-term studies demonstrate that firms and institutions undergo patterned structural transformations characterized by punctuated shifts in strategy, coordination, and complexity, indicating that development also operates at the level of the collective system rather than solely within individual agents (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Family systems research similarly shows that developmental change is distributed across relational networks, where alterations in one member reorganizes the entire system of interaction, producing stable yet transformable patterns of co-regulation over time (Fogel, 1993; Minuchin, 1974; Sameroff, 2010). At broader scales, cultural evolution research provides strong evidence that collective systems accumulate and transform informational and behavioral patterns across generations, producing cumulative complexity in tools, norms, and institutions through relational processes of transmission, selection, and recombination (Henrich, 2015). At the planetary level, Earth system science demonstrates that socio-ecological processes operate as coupled dynamics, in which human activity and biophysical systems co-evolve, producing measurable regime shifts in climate and biosphere organization (Steffen et al., 2015). These findings across scales of collective development provide converging support for the claim that development is not confined to individuals but also appears as an emergent property of multi-scalar relational systems. However, much of the field, particularly in Western contexts, remains implicitly centered on the individual as the primary developmental unit, such that relational, cultural, and ecological contexts are often treated as influencing environments rather than being prioritized or granted primary status as developing systems in their own right (Overton, 2015; Sameroff, 2010).

Both the fields of complexity and developmental science, despite having strands that prioritize relationally, arrive at the threshold of a relational science without fully crossing it. Complexity science shows that relational interaction generates emergent order; developmental science shows that relational order transforms over time. What neither fully provides is an account in which relation is treated as a primary domain of inquiry, co-equal with being, knowing, and doing. Naming that domain is the task of the next section.

VI. Relatology: The Study of Relating

Western philosophy has organized reflexive inquiry into three canonical domains: ontology, the study of being; epistemology, the study of knowing; and methodology, the study of doing. Relations appear in all three but are at home in none. Where they have been studied systematically, they have been treated within domain-bound frameworks: relational ontologies, relational epistemologies and relational methodologies. Systems theory examines relations among components (Bertalanffy, 1968), network science formalizes relations as edges between nodes (Newman, 2010), and structural and phenomenological sociologies examine relations as constitutive of social meaning (Schutz, 1967). Where relationality has been elevated philosophically, the result has often been framed as a relational ontology, as in Whitehead's process philosophy or Barad's agential realism, in which being is reconfigured as becoming or intra-action, yet the underlying triadic architecture of ontology, epistemology, and methodology remains largely unaltered (Barad, 2007; Whitehead, 1929).

What no existing field, that is considered legitimate at scale, does is treat relating as a co-equal domain of reflexive inquiry and systematically analyze how relational structures co-constitute being, knowing, and doing as mutually generative rather than hierarchically separable. Taking a meta-cultural perspective, influenced by Chinese, Indian, African and indigenous orientations that resist categorization into, or by, Western orientations toward ontology, epistemology and methodology, viewing relationality as equally primary is the gap that relatology is proposed to fill (Wright, 2025a). Relatology is the study of relating, as ontology is the study of being, epistemology the study of knowing, and methodology the study of doing. Its subject matter includes relationality of all cosmological forms, whether those are agents, systems, concepts, disciplines or relationships that condition what can be known, enacted, and rendered intelligible as existing. The proposal is conservative in form, a simple fourth addition to the classical triad, and radical in implication, since it renders visible that the classical domains already operate within relational conditions they do not explicitly theorize or acknowledge.

The move reorganizes the architecture of inquiry granting "relating" equal weight to "doing," "knowing," and "being," such that entities are no longer assumed to be ontologically primary with relations subsequently added, but can also be understood as emergent stabilized effects of ongoing relational processes. Process philosophy reframes reality in terms of events and becoming rather than static substance, where enduring "things" appear as secondary abstractions from processual continuity (Whitehead, 1929). Relational sociology similarly reconfigures social reality as emerging from relational dynamics rather than pre-formed individuals, emphasizing the co-constitution of agency and structure within relational fields (Emirbayer, 1997). In assemblage theory and actor-network theory, heterogeneous elements are understood as temporarily stabilized configurations in which entities are effects of dynamic relations rather than self-contained units, while nevertheless retaining a degree of operational closure within specific arrangements (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Latour, 2005). Within this context, relatology can be understood as a meta-relational orientation that questions the primacy of epistemology, methodology, and ontology as self-contained domains,

proposing relating as a foundational dimension that can both precede and organize distinctions among knowing, doing, and being, while also functioning as the connective condition through which these domains co-emerge and relate.

Parallel developments appear across systems theory and complexity science, where order emerges from interactional dynamics rather than isolated parts, though typically without fully relinquishing the analytic primacy of components (Bertalanffy, 1968; Morin, 2008). In social systems theory, communication rather than individuals becomes the basic unit of analysis, with systems reproducing themselves through relational interactions (Luhmann, 1995). In cognitive science, enactivist and embodied approaches similarly reframe cognition as arising through structural coupling between organism and environment, emphasizing that knowing is enacted rather than represented (Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007; Varela, 1999). However, these developments remain distributed across disciplines and are not yet unified within a domain that treats relationality itself as a primary orientation of systematic theoretical articulation.

Relatology therefore consolidates what is already implicit across these fields and makes space for a "relational science", validating the foundational legitimacy of findings across the social, complexity and developmental sciences while readying the field for a paradigm shift that supports relationality to be primary in contexts where that is appropriate. This supports the development of a relational meta-disciplinary whole human science without asserting that relating is universally primary, without collapsing relationality into individual disciplines and without relations being absorbed into Western epistemologies, methodologies and ontologies.

As with all emerging fields, mapping the field is but one step in the direction of generating a defensible paradigm that will need to be critiqued, stress tested, and applied to be visible at scale and across contexts. Relatology does not dissolve disciplines or domains into relationality, but rather, it provides a second-order frame within which their partiality becomes intelligible without being treated as deficiency. If relating can also be seen as primary, then scientific inquiry must increasingly attend to contexts in which interaction patterns, structural coupling, assemblage formation, and multi-scalar relational dynamics are foundational rather than derivative phenomena, reframing scientific inquiry itself as being able to orient through a fundamentally relational paradigm, rather than merely applying relationality to isolated objects or subjects.

VII. Epmereontology: The Meta-Study of Knowing, Doing, Relating and Being

Once relatology is admitted as a foundational field of inquiry alongside epistemology, methodology and ontology, the relational interactions among the four domains also become domains of inquiry, and a universifying meta-framework can be derived rather than asserted. Relatology supports relationality between these domains, universifying pairwise couplings that both preserves the diverse integrity of each while unifying them in dynamic relational dialogical generative tension. *Epistemontology*, coined by the author in a previous paper (Wright, 2025b), names the co-constitution, in resonance with what Esbjörn-Hargens (2022) calls 'mutual enactment', of knowing and being, the loop diagnosed in Sections II and III through which what exists shapes what we know, and what we know shapes what exists (Bhaskar, 2008; Merleau-Ponty, 2012). *Epistemethodology* names the co-constitution of knowing and doing: methods are not neutral instruments applied to pre-given questions but structured practices that determine what can appear as knowledge at all, and forms of knowledge generate forms of doing (Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 2012). *Ontomethodology* names the co-constitution of being and doing: forms of doing render forms of being, and forms of being generate

forms of doing (Dewey, 1938; Foucault, 1970). Epmereontology proposes that while epistemology, methodology, relatology and ontology are all irreducible domains in their own right, each relational coupling also is a genuine domain of study to be further developed and filled out, and none is reducible to the others, as ontology supports the study of the existence of all, epistemology supports the study of knowing of all, and methodology supports the study of enaction of all, relatology likewise supports the studying of relating of all, while operating as a transversal domain through which each of these, as well as the generated universifying couplings themselves, can relate.

The universification of these domains and their couplings, with relatology as the binding fourth domain, yields the meta-study of *epmereontology*, spanning knowing, doing, relating and being. The coinage carries its argument in its construction. It elides its four constituents, *ep*istemology, *me*thodology, *r*elatology, and *ont*ology, while the embedded syllable *mere* invokes mereology, the formal study of part-whole relations (Simons, 1987; Varzi, 2019). This double construction is a universification of the part-whole relation, binding the four domains: each discipline, tradition, and configuration of knowing, doing, relating, and being is a part that expresses the whole field, and the whole field exists through its differentiated parts. Mereology here is an internally coherent dynamic, supported by the Chinese orientation towards 'zhongyong dialectics' as coined by Qin (2018), perhaps best elucidated through the yinyang model, since any domain of inquiry is simultaneously a whole within its domain and a partial articulation of broader relational processes that exceed its categories (Morin, 2008; Whitehead, 1929). Epmereontology is therefore, in a single term, the universification of the four domains of reflexive inquiry and the meta-study of how wholes and parts co-constitute one another throughout, operating through a second order meta-epistemological, meta-methodological, meta-relatological and meta-ontological orientation (Wright, 2025a).

Several proximate frameworks lay parts of the groundwork for an epmereontological orientation. Luhmann (1995) provides indispensable resources for understanding knowledge systems as functionally differentiated subsystems, and the language of coupling used here resonates with his structural coupling; the resonance is not identity, since Luhmann's couplings hold between operationally closed communication systems, whereas epmereontological couplings hold between domains of reflexive inquiry and make no commitment to operational closure. Integral theory (Wilber, 2000) maps phenomena across quadrants and levels, with its quadrants partitioning reality into individual and collective, interior and exterior, an architecture that epmereontology treats as a comprehensive useful epistemological configuration among others. Transdisciplinarity (Nicolescu, 2002) affirms multiple levels of reality and epistemological plurality; epmereontology extends it by specifying the internal relational structure of that plurality, the recursive coupling of the four domains, holding them in universifying generative tension.

The epmereontological architecture reframes the human sciences in a way that can be seen through an ecosystemic relational meta-disciplinary lens in addition to a collection of independent disciplines that can have internal and relational coherence. While disciplines differ in subject matter, they may also differ in dominant epmereontological couplings, each foregrounding certain couplings while backgrounding others and thereby producing a partially internally coherent resolution of the whole field. While disciplinary boundaries can be seen through epistemological, methodological and ontological divisions, they can also be stabilized, or stabilizing, attractors within a shared relatological orientation. Integration accordingly can be supported relationally through interdisciplinary aggregation and methodological pluralism, while also aligning across ontological assumptions,

epistemic validation structures, methodological practices, and relational configurations, supporting the resolution of higher-order fragmentation and generating relational coherence while maintaining appropriate contextual diversity (Bhaskar, 2008; Nicolescu, 2002). Explanation, too, can be reframed: while a phenomenon may be understood when decomposed into causal mechanisms within a single domain, additionally its ontological structure, epistemological framing, methodological enactment, and relational embedding become mutually intelligible within a dynamic dialogical configuration (Barad, 2007; Bhaskar, 2008). Before the framework is put to work, it requires grounding of a different kind: evidence that relational primacy is not merely one more Western theoretical preference that intellectually colonizes philosophical orientations and instead honors a planetary meta-cultural diversity of ways of knowing, doing, relating, and being.

VIII. Relational Wisdom Across Civilizations

If the argument so far is coherent, substance primacy and the resultant orientations are a civilizational inheritance rather than a defining discovery about the nature of reality. Evidence for this claim through meta-cultural analysis can help highlight biases through a dialogical generative process of universification (Wright, 2024). Across civilizations that developed in relative independence from one another, relational primacy appears not as an exception but as a recurring philosophical and cosmological orientation (Jullien, 2004). In Chinese thought, for example, classical Daoist and Confucian traditions emphasize process, relational harmony, and dynamic interdependence rather than fixed substance (Ames & Hall, 2003; Graham, 1989). In South Asian philosophical systems, particularly in Buddhist and Vedānta traditions, reality is frequently articulated in terms of dependent origination or relational co-arising rather than self-subsisting entities (Kalupahana, 1992; Varela et al., 1991). Indigenous orientations across diverse regions similarly foreground relationality as constitutive of existence rather than as a secondary feature of pre-given things, emphasizing land, kinship, and cosmology as mutually co-constituting fields of relation (Deloria, 2006; Simpson, 2017). This convergence does not demonstrate relational primacy as a universal truth claim, but it does weaken the assumption that relational primacy is culturally anomalous or philosophically derivative. Instead, it suggests that what is often treated as "substance ontology" in Western traditions may represent a historically specific stabilization of one mode of intelligibility among others, rather than a neutral description of reality itself (Needham, 1956; Shapin, 1994). The Western configuration becomes one regional crystallization of a broader human capacity to organize experience, rather than the default structure of thought against which all others are measured.

In the classical Chinese tradition, the Daoist corpus presents a cosmos of mutually arising processes rather than enduring substances. The *Zhuangzi* dissolves fixed boundaries between self and world, knower and known, in favor of transformation and co-dependence (Zhuangzi, 2013), and the broader tradition treats harmony, the right relation among elements, as more fundamental than the elements themselves. In the Buddhist Madhyamaka tradition, Nāgārjuna's doctrine of *śūnyatā*, emptiness, holds that all phenomena are empty of self-nature precisely because they arise through dependent origination: to be is to be relationally constituted (Garfield, 1995). Emptiness here is not nihilism but relational fullness, the recognition that nothing exists from its own side.

Indigenous relational orientations make a related priority explicit in cosmology, language, and method. Kimmerer (2013) describes a grammar of animacy in Potawatomi in which the living world is addressed as kin rather than referred to as object, language itself encoding a relational orientation that English renders nearly unsayable. In African

philosophy, the Ubuntu principle that a person is a person through other persons locates personhood in relation: the individual is constituted through community rather than prior to it, with corresponding implications for communal primacy rather than individual prioritization (Wiredu, 1980). In the Islamic philosophical tradition, Ibn al-ʿArabī's *waḥdat al-wujūd*, the unity of being, treats differentiation as the self-disclosure of a single relational ground, and his concept of the *barzakh*, the isthmus, provides a developed category for the productive between, that which simultaneously separates and joins (Chittick, 1989). Western thought has its own precursors, Buber's (1970) I-Thou foremost among them, in which the between is the site where being becomes personal at all.

Two clarifications guard this survey against predictable misreadings. First, these traditions are not saying the same thing. Śūnyatā is not Ubuntu; the barzakh is not the Dao. Their convergence lies not in shared doctrine but in a shared structural move, the refusal to grant separable substance the final word, and treating them as interchangeable would repeat, in the register of appreciation, the very flattening this paper argues against, whether that is flattening towards irreconcilable plurality or flattening towards universal perenniality. Second, the obvious objection must be faced: is epmereontology not simply another Western framework colonizing non-Western thought, extracting relational insights and re-housing them in an academic architecture? The risk is real, and the response is methodological rather than rhetorical. A universifying framework is validated by its capacity to receive and hold traditions without reducing them, to render them mutually intelligible while preserving what is irreducible in each, generating a dialogical interaction that supports relational coherence across contexts. Where it fails that test, where a tradition's insight must be distorted to fit the framework, not the tradition, is to be dialogically revised and developed, for relations are not a Western theoretical novelty awaiting validation nor are they owned by any specific culture or civilization, but are a shared recurring discovery of consciousness, that have systematically been backgrounded by one tradition that mistook its lens for the landscape, and going forwards can be highlighted through a whole human science.

Epmereontology, as a reconfiguration of inquiry that integrates epistemology, methodology, relatology and ontology into a coherent dialogical architecture, provides a conceptual foundation for decolonial critique by destabilizing the assumption that any one tradition has achieved a neutral or universal account of reality. Decolonial theorists have long argued that modern Western epistemology is inseparable from colonial forms of knowledge production, in which particular ways of knowing are elevated to universality while other ontological and epistemic formations are rendered local, premodern, or non-rational (Mignolo, 2011; Quijano, 2000). By situating relating as co-constitutive with being, knowing, and doing, epmereontology reframes these hierarchies as effects of a historically specific configuration of inquiry rather than as inevitable features of cognition or reality itself. This shift aligns with decolonial critiques of the “coloniality of knowledge,” in which epistemic authority is tied to power rather than to neutral access to truth (Grosfoguel, 2007; Mignolo, 2011). Within this frame, decolonization is not limited to the inclusion of alternative perspectives within an existing epistemological structure, but involves a dialogical transformation of the structure of inquiry itself. Relational orientations already present in Indigenous, African, Chinese and other non-Western philosophical traditions become intelligible not as empirical anomalies within a universal schema, but as parallel articulations of relational intelligibility that were previously subordinated within substance-centered epistemologies (Deloria, 2006; Simpson, 2017). Epmereontology thus supports decolonization by displacing the implicit hierarchy in which ontology, epistemology, and methodology are treated as separable domains anchored in a rational framework, foregrounding a universification of

relational configurations through which worlds are known, enacted, and sustained (Escobar, 2018; Varela et al., 1991). In doing so, epmereontology reframes epistemic justice as inseparable from ontological and methodological development, rather than as an additive extension of existing academic canons.

IX. The Case of Whole Person Psychology

The framework's value can be tested with the discipline that intimately engages with the human subject-object split — psychology. Whole person psychology, which attempts to integrate all sub-disciplines of psychology within a coherent whole — from behavioral to cognitive to positive to transpersonal — represents one of the most ambitious expansions of inquiry in the human sciences. From Maslow's (1971) studies of the farther reaches of human nature, through Grof's (2000) cartographies of non-ordinary states and Wilber's (2000) integral psychology, to the transpersonal traditions cultivated at institutions such as CIHS, the field has progressively widened what counts as a legitimate aspect of the subject-object inquiry: body, mind, and consciousness; states, stages, and types; the personal, prepersonal, and transpersonal. Hartelius (2016) captures the orientation towards a whole person psychology by pointing to transpersonal psychology, which is concerned with persons as irreducible complex systems whose emergent properties exceed the sum of their parts and whose lives unfold in connection with social, ecological, and cosmological contexts.

Read through the epmereontological framework, whole person psychology can be understood as a partial reconfiguration of the *epistemontological* knowing–being coupling within psychology, and in doing so has also expanded legitimate methodologies that have advanced the field of psychology as a whole. By expanding the epistemological register to include first-person, phenomenological, and contemplative modes of inquiry, and the ontological register to include states and structures of consciousness not easily reduced to behavioral or neural correlates, whole person psychology has generated methodological processes that go beyond the observational post-positivist approaches to include rigorous phenomenological, inter-subjective, embodied and contemplative forms of psychological inquiry (Hartelius et al., 2021; Thompson, 2007; Varela et al., 1991). Through an epmereontological lens, whole person psychology can be seen as an example of an integrative psychological meta-discipline that supports coherence among all sub-disciplines within the wider discipline of psychology, as well as extending outwards, transcending the discipline of psychology to engage inter-disciplinarily with other disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, cognitive neuroscience and the emerging consciousness science, developing inter-disciplinary as well as trans-disciplinary approaches to support relational coherence between disciplines, thereby rebalancing the asymmetry introduced by post-positivist psychology, which privileged third-person observation and measurement over first- and second-person dimensions of experience, all the while integrating the post-positivist psychologies and also expanding the field of psychology as a whole. This constitutes a genuine expansion of what may be known, what may count as real, and what can be done within psychological inquiry, and is an example of an emerging field that operates according to relational principles of epmereontology.

Yet, despite the integrative orientation, due to institutional rigidity, lack of funding sources and legitimate concern of excommunication from the scientific field, the methodological and relational dimensions of whole person psychology often remain anchored in individual-centered assumptions, and bias towards empirical research, even when persons may be theoretically understood as relationally embedded within developmental, cultural, and transpersonal contexts. From an epmereontological perspective, this is relatively contextually appropriate within the field of psychology at

this point in its development, to focus on the person as opposed to relational inter-connectedness, and what can be measured empirically rather than what can be inferred outside a closed loop experimental system. What epmereontology adds to this is a wider relational field of inquiry — a whole human approach — which goes beyond the person, while including the individual, to also hold the human collective, as well as human relations, both among other humans as well as with all cosmological forms, legitimizing the study of a range of meta-cultural epistemological, methodological, relatological and ontological orientations that have historically been discriminated against in scientific inquiry. This can mutually support the field of whole person psychology to fulfill its orientation towards wholeness, as well as support whole human science by operating as an emerging entry point for an expression of whole human science, which through meta-disciplinarity, can dialogically engage with a diversity of human science disciplines to generate a more whole picture of human phenomena.

As the human sciences currently stand, relationality tends to appear as a dimension of experience, a developmental influence, or a contextual factor rather than as the generative field through which persons emerge and become intelligible (Hartelius et al., 2018; Slife, 2004). Developmental systems theorists, ecological psychologists, and cultural psychologists have moved further toward relational explanations by demonstrating that cognition, identity, and development arise through ongoing interactions among biological, social, and environmental processes (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Lerner, 2006; Valsiner, 2007). Nevertheless, these relational insights often remain organized around the development, functioning, or transformation of persons rather than around relationality itself as a primary domain of inquiry.

This is precisely the pattern the epmereontological framework predicts. Through an epmereontological lens, psychology can be seen as a stabilized configuration that foregrounds a Western epistemontological form of knowing–being coupling around the individual person as a focal unit, and its most ambitious internal expansions tend to reach the limits of that configuration without fully reconfiguring the underlying assumptions of the discipline of psychology itself. One area where transpersonal psychology and whole person psychology have largely been successful is in going outside the bounds of Western thought to study and integrate non-Western practices, such as meditation, yoga and breathing. Where cognitive and neuroscientific approaches ignore, decontextualize and appropriate practices from other cultures, building on whole person and transpersonal approaches, a whole human approach enters into a decolonial dialogical relation with these cultures, honoring their ontological, epistemological, methodological and relatological orientations as legitimate and potentially contextually appropriate at a wider scale, respectfully broadening the scope of what can be studied, understood and integrated into a meta-cultural, meta-disciplinary whole human science that is functional not just in the Western world, but at a planetary scale.

X. Whole Human Science

Whole human science names the integrative horizon toward which relatology and epmereontology are directed. It is not intended as a new discipline among others, nor a synthesis of existing fields, but a reconfiguration of the conditions under which the human sciences become relationally coherent and mutually intelligible while retaining their internal differentiation. It is neither a unification project in the classical sense nor a pluralist juxtaposition of incommensurable perspectives, but an attempt to articulate the relational architecture through which unity and diversity develop dialogical coherence without collapsing (Klein, 1990; Morin, 2008; Nicolescu, 2002). In this sense, whole human science is meta-disciplinary, in dialogical relation with all forms of disciplinarity, as well as meta-cultural, in dialogical relation with all forms of culture,

as well as concerned not merely with collaboration among disciplines but also with the conditions that generate and modify disciplinary distinctions themselves (Nicolescu, 2002).

A central shift is to expand from a focus on objects and isolated entities to include multi-level relational processes throughout the scientific disciplines, while supporting contextual prioritization. Informed by and in relation with both complexity science and developmental science, whole human science supports a generative dialogical relation between them, to enrich both and enrich all disciplines they come in contact with, supporting coherence in this field of human sciences.

As the emerging meta-crisis becomes more apparent in collective awareness, the specific cultural and civilizational orientations can go through a developmental transformation supported by a whole human science, generating collective coherence as a relational embodiment of the meta-chrysalis. Held in a wider relational field, whole human science, operating through meta-cultural orientations, can let go of attachments to ways of knowing, doing, relating and being that are no longer serving the planetary whole, and enter into dialogical engagement with the planetary wisdom humanity as a whole can access. This may require a level of humility and surrender from the cultures and civilizations that share our planet, acknowledging the collective trauma in a process of planet-wide decolonial restorative justice, while holding compassion for all, with commitment to collaborating as coherent civilizations among many, to steward the planet into a form that is hospitable to all cosmological forms that depend upon it to live.

Science is a gatekeeper in this process, a legitimizing structure and process that reinforces certain orientations through education, the media and institutions, and can also be a facilitator. A whole human science can be seen as a generative support system that helps open the gates to a world in transformation, building upon the successes of science in offering what Hartelius, Thouin-Savard, and Richards Crouch call, “a method that attempts to go beyond validation through lived personal and communal experience” (2018, p. iv) and extends that offer to include contextually appropriate relational methods that support human unity while honoring the diversity of human forms of knowing, doing, relating and being.

XI. Conclusion and Critique

The argument can be stated in a single arc. The fragmentation of the human sciences is not merely an institutional accident but the inheritance of a substance-centered configuration of inquiry that privileges entities over relations and separation over connection. Addressing this fragmentation requires recognizing relating as a co-equal domain of inquiry among knowing, doing and being, and framing ontology, epistemology, methodology, and relatology within the second-order framework of epmereontology. This proposal is grounded meta-culturally in the recurrent appearance of relational orientations across diverse civilizational traditions and illustrated here through the case of psychology, where the expansion toward whole person inquiry reveals both the possibilities and limits of an individual-centered framework. The field thereby disclosed is developmental and complex, and whole human science names the horizon of its reconfiguration: a relational meta-disciplinary approach that generates and prioritizes contextually coherent forms of knowing, doing, relating and being.

Several potential limitations of this elucidation of a whole human science must be acknowledged. First, the central constructs, particularly relatology and epmereontology, remain primarily theoretical and require operationalization. Without methodological elaboration and empirical application, they risk functioning as interpretive meta-language rather than as productive research architecture. Second, the proposed universifying patterns require more rigorous evaluation across domains

and scales. Future work must distinguish carefully among structural identity, functional similarity, family resemblance, and metaphorical resonance, avoiding the tendency of integrative frameworks to infer equivalence from analogy alone (Bateson, 1979; Morin, 2008). Third, the framework carries an inherent risk of over-integration. Meta-theoretical systems can inadvertently smooth over discontinuities, contradictions, and incommensurabilities that are themselves sources of knowledge and development. A relationally integrative science must therefore remain capable of preserving irreducible difference and complexity rather than translating all distinctions into higher-order unity (Nicolescu, 2002). Fourth, if inquiry can indeed be structured through epmereontological couplings, and it is pragmatically useful to do so, then methods to instantiate distinct configurations of knowing, doing, relating, and being need to be developed. A major research task is therefore to map how qualitative, quantitative, participatory, contemplative, and mixed-method approaches enact different yet potentially interoperable configurations of inquiry (Barad, 2007; Dewey, 1938; Shotter, 2011).

These limitations define the research program rather than diminish it. Priorities include developing relatology as a field in its own right, including formal and empirical models of relational fields across psychological, social, cultural, ecological, and civilizational scales; refining epmereontology through comparative case studies that examine how research programs shift when ontological, epistemological, methodological, and relatological assumptions are made explicit; and testing the proposed universifying meta-pattern across biological, cognitive, cultural, and institutional domains while clarifying its limits of applicability. A further line of inquiry concerns institutional transformation, since a relationally integrative science may depend as much upon changes in academic organization, funding structures, publication systems, and transdisciplinary collaboration as upon theoretical innovation itself (Foucault, 1970; Klein, 1990; Luhmann, 1995). The framework must therefore remain reflexively open to, and dialogically engage in, revision. Its value will be measured not by internal coherence alone but by its capacity to generate inquiry that is empirically productive, conceptually clarifying, methodologically generative, and relationally integrative in support of humanity as a whole.

If the meta-crisis of the present era is less a terminal breakdown than a transformative meta-chrysalis, a period in which inherited structures are simultaneously dissolving and reorganizing (Wright, 2025a), then the human sciences face a developmental choice of their own. They may continue as a collection of increasingly refined instruments, each resolving its objects with growing precision while the relations among those objects remain fragmented, or they may absorb insights long cultivated across the world's philosophical traditions, diversify their modes of inquiry accordingly, connect across disciplinary boundaries inherited from earlier epistemic configurations, and gradually cohere into an orientation approaching a whole human science. Contemporary science taught us to see the details of individual trees with unprecedented clarity. The next developmental step may be learning to perceive the complex inter-connectedness of the living forest without losing sight of the trees.

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About the Author

Fionn Wright was born in 1990 and grew up around the world, spending a quarter of his life in Europe, a quarter in Africa, a quarter in North America and a quarter in Asia. He has become a meta-cultural global citizen who feels a sense of responsibility to support a healthy unification of diverse consciousness on Planet Earth.


Fionn became known on the streets of Shanghai as an expert in personal development, conscious parenting, and innovative education through his livestreaming in fluent Chinese to over a million viewers, with TV appearances reaching over 100 million views. He's also an award winning documentary producer, serial entrepreneur and keynote speaker, named by City Weekend Magazine as one of the "11 Most Influential Movers & Shakers in Shanghai" – a city of 24 million.

Passionate about education and development, he leveraged his media presence to sponsor his family to live off the grid in a camper for a year to worldschool his own children in the mountains of British Columbia, and presented at hundreds of schools across the world such as the American International School of Mozambique, the Yew Cheng International School and Loreto College and universities such as the London School of Economics, Zhejiang University and University College Dublin, as well as corporations such as Siemens, Roche and Nike. As an integrative coach with an Individualized Masters in Self Design and a PhD candidate in Integral Noetic Science with a specialization in Meta-Theory, he has trained in a variety of modalities including STAGES Coaching, Generating Transformative Change, Leadership Circle Profile, Hakomi Mindfulness-based Somatic Psychotherapy, NLP Master Practitioner, ActionCOACH Business Coaching, Neuroscience for Coaching, Process Facilitation and many more.


He coaches, advises and consults for leaders in Entrepreneur Organization, Young Presidents Organization and Family Business Network, and leads international teams of world-class practitioners to develop personalized programs for these leaders and their families based on their developmental levels, shadow and a wide range of integrative assessments. He is currently exploring the expansion of our collective leading edge, developing global leadership programs integrating real-time developmental AI, biofeedback, psychedelics, shadow-work, epigenetics and meta-funding models.

As the creator of Universifying — an integrative Meta-Model, Theory and Practice to birth our world through the meta-crisis — Fionn is holding space for an ethically-oriented emergence of a wiser young meta-collective to manifest a global technologically-supported evolutionary meta-ecosystem for us to wake up our awareness, grow up our perspectives, light up our wholeness and show up to regenerate our planet.


Other Works by Fionn



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
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